This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]
Printed for the Committee of Imperial Defence. April 1927.
105
SECRET.
787-B.
(Also Papers Nos. C.O.S. 72
and C.P. 115 (27).)
COMMITTEE OF IMPERIAL DEFENCE.
THE SITUATION IN CHINA, APRIL 4, 1927.
Copy No.
33
REPORT BY THE CHIEFS OF STAFF SUB-COMMITTEE.
SINCE the Meeting of the Cabinet at which we were present on the 1st April we have met twice to consider further the question of reprisals in the contingency of the Nationalist Government refusing satisfaction for the outrages at Nanking. At our request the Chief of the Naval Staff has exchanged several telegrams with the Naval Commander-in-Chief, and the latter has been in communication with the American, Japanese and French Naval Commanders-in-Chief on the China Station. At a meeting held this morning we felt that we now had sufficient information to enable us to make definite proposals to the Cabinet.
2. The views of the British, American, Japanese and French Commanders-in- Chief in regard to the enforcement of an ultimatum are contained in the Naval Commander-in-Chief's telegram No. 940, dated the 3rd April (Appendix I), and are analysed in the Table attached to this Report (Appendix II). From this it will be seen that the Naval Commanders-in-Chief are substantially in agreement in regard to the measures of reprisal open to them, though they differ as to the order of importance. If, however, we omit those forms of reprisal to which one or other nation alone attaches importance (e.g., the American Admiral would like to seize the Customs revenue at Shanghai, which the British Admiral rejects altogether, and the French Admiral attaches special importance to a blockade and seizure of Chinese shipping, on which the others express no view) it will be found that the views coincide on the following as the most suitable forms of reprisal :-
(a.) The seizure and destruction of the Wusung forts.
(b.) The bombardment of the Yangtse forts.
(c.) The destruction of the arsenals at Hankow and Canton, but not at Shanghai, owing to the risk to civilians and the danger to adjacent American buildings.
(d.) The seizure or destruction of the Cantonese fleet.
3. We concur in the above views of the Naval Commanders-in-Chief in China, and we recommend that the forms of reprisal which they suggest should be adopted by His Majesty's Government as the basis of the sanctions to an ultimatum.
4. In making this recommendation we do not put aside our previous proposals in favour of interrupting military traffic along and across the Yangtse, and of a blockade.
5. As regards the interruption of cross-river traffic, the Commander-in-Chief confirms the opinion expressed to the Cabinet on our behalf on the 1st April by the Chief of the Naval Staff that at Nanking, where there are guns mounted to command
[15987]
B
39
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.